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I. INTRODUCTION 
September 11, 2001 (9/11) will be remembered as a turning 
point in American history.  When the terrorist attacks occurred, the 
United States had been enjoying a significant period of overall na-
tional prosperity and relative peace on the home front.1  9/11 signi-
fied that global terrorism would be taken to new extremes and that 
nobody was safe.2  At the same time, challenges and doubts from both 
home and abroad shed light on a problem just as important as the 
problem of preventing terrorists from carrying out their sinister 
plans.3  How much of our individual liberties, as Americans, could we 
sacrifice for the sake of national security before we gave up precisely 
those rights that make us American?  This is the issue that courts face 
when forced to determine the legality of anti-terrorism measures such 
as the random search policy of the New York City Police Department 
(“NYPD”) in city subways.4  While the basic desire for survival dictates 
that national security measures be taken to protect our very existence, 
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1
 William E. Gibson & Rafael Lorente, ‘A Remarkable Resilience’ From Recession and 
Shark Attacks to a Rebirth of American Spirit, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Dec. 
30, 2001, at 6. 
 2 See Editorial, Finish the Job, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 11, 2002, at 8A. 
 3 See Editorial, Don’t Sacrifice Civil Liberties, OREGONIAN, Nov. 3, 2001, at E4. 
 4 See Kit R. Roane et al., Drawing a Line in the Subway. (New York Civil Liberties Un-
ion Sues the City of New York Over Random Subway Passenger Searches), U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., Nov. 14, 2005, at 26. 
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we must never forget that our existence derives much of its meaning 
from certain rights and freedoms. 
This Comment addresses the constitutionality of the NYPD’s 
random search policy under the Fourth Amendment’s search and 
seizure clause5 and possible legal initiatives that can make this anti-
terrorism measure, and others, more effective.  Part I provides the 
context in which the controversy surrounding the search policy is to 
be understood.  Part II undertakes a constitutional analysis of the 
search policy under the Fourth Amendment,6 including a review of 
the decision by the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York.7  Part III examines the weaknesses of the current 
search policy, even assuming the policy is constitutional.  Part IV con-
siders possible modifications to the policy and broader governmental 
and societal changes that would allow for a more effective fight 
against terrorism. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. 9/11 Terrorist Attacks 
On the morning of 9/11, under a clear, blue, sunny sky, thou-
sands of men and women made their way to the World Trade Center 
to report for work, as they would on any Tuesday morning.  Little did 
they realize that they would be witness to the cold, calculated mass 
murder of thousands of innocent people that fateful day.  At 8:45 
a.m., American Airlines Flight 11, a hijacked passenger airplane car-
rying ninety-two people from Boston to Los Angeles, smashed into 
One World Trade Center, exploding on impact and leaving behind a 
trail of smoke and fire where there was once office space.8  Less than 
twenty minutes later, United Airlines Flight 175, another hijacked 
passenger airplane—this one carrying sixty-five people from Boston 
to Los Angeles—followed suit, crashing into Two World Trade Cen-
 
 
5
 The search and seizure clause is part of the Fourth Amendment: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (search and seizure clause in italics). 
 6 Id. 
 
7
 MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05 Civ. 6921, 2005 WL 3338573 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005) 
[hereinafter MacWade I]. 
 
8
 Paul Moses, Terrorist Attacks/A Day of Infamy/Hijacked Planes Hit WTC and Penta-
gon, NEWSDAY (New York), Sept. 12, 2001, at W02. 
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ter.9  On the streets, onlookers watched in horror as people jumped 
out of the buildings to their deaths in an effort to avoid the unbear-
able flames above.10  Officially, the death toll from the destruction of 
the World Trade Center was 2749, including tenants and visitors of 
the towers, rescue personnel, airplane crew and passengers, and indi-
viduals on the street and in adjacent buildings.11  Combined with two 
related and deadly incidents on that same day, a hijacked airplane 
crash into the Pentagon and a foiled terrorist attack, which resulted 
in the crash of a hijacked airplane into an open Pennsylvania field, 
the events of 9/11 told Americans they were no longer safe.12 
The United States responded quickly and decisively to the ter-
rorist attacks.  President George W. Bush created the Office of Home-
land Security and officially initiated a war against global terrorism,13 
preparing the way for military action in Afghanistan and Iraq.14  Both 
houses of Congress, within days of 9/11, approved a forty billion dol-
lar emergency aid package to help victims of the attacks and to help 
bring those responsible for the attacks to justice.15  Six-and-a-half 
weeks after 9/11, the President signed into law the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act),16 
a measure designed to give the government broader powers in fight-
 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 
11
 Eric Lipton, Study Maps the Location of Deaths in the Twin Towers, N.Y. TIMES, July 
22, 2004, at B3. 
 
12
 Moses, supra note 8.  At 9:43 a.m., hijackers, holding knives and box-cutters, 
crashed American Airlines Flight 77, which carried more than fifty passengers and 
pilots, into the Pentagon.  David Whitman, Day of Infamy: A Timeline of Terror (Septem-
ber 11, 2001), U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 14, 2001, at 18.  Within an hour, all fed-
eral buildings, including the White House, Congress, the Justice Department, the 
State Department, and the Supreme Court, were evacuated.  Id.  At 10:10 a.m., 
United Airlines Flight 93, commandeered by hijackers and carrying forty-five passen-
gers, crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, about eighty miles southeast of Pitts-
burgh.  Id.  The plane was believed to be heading towards the U.S. Capitol, the White 
House, or Camp David.  Id. 
 
13
 George Bush, President of the United States, Address to a Joint Session of Con-
gress and the American People (September 20, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html. 
 14 See Mark Thompson & Michael Duffy, Is the Army Stretched Too Thin?, TIME, 
Sept. 1, 2003, at 36. 
 15 Senate Vote Lets Bush Wage War; $40 Bil to Rebuild and Fight Back, INVESTOR'S BUS. 
DAILY, Sept. 17, 2001, at A01. 
 
16
 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of the 
United States Code). 
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ing terror at home.17  Key provisions of the original USA PATRIOT 
Act included the following: the ease with which the federal govern-
ment could conduct electronic surveillance, including roving wire-
taps;18 the FBI’s access to certain private records;19 the ability to detain 
immigrants suspected of terrorism for up to a week without being 
charged with a crime;20 and the requirement that banks find the 
sources of money in certain large private accounts.21  Sixteen of the 
more contentious22 sections of the USA PATRIOT Act, including the 
roving wiretap and FBI access provisions mentioned above, were 
scheduled to expire at the end of 2005.23  On March 8, 2006, Presi-
dent Bush signed the renewal of the USA PATRIOT Act.24 
Though the country witnessed a rare display of unity in the im-
mediate aftermath of 9/11, as evidenced by the outpouring of grief 
and determination to overcome the trauma of that day, tension 
quickly began to mount in response to some of the government’s 
anti-terror measures.  Throughout the nation, there emerged a de-
bate regarding the appropriate balance between protecting civil lib-
erties and protecting national security.25  News and print media 
openly questioned and criticized the government’s anti-terror poli-
cies as going too far in curtailing civil liberties.26  Organizations such 
as the American Civil Liberties Union denounced the fight against 
terrorism as a war against immigrants, especially pointing out the 
mass detention of hundreds of immigrants, some of whom were 
 
 
17
 Ann McFeatters, Bush Signs Anti-Terror Bill, Says Tough Law Will Preserve Constitu-
tional Rights, PITTSBURGH POST–GAZETTE, October 27, 2001, at A6. 
 
18
 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2000 & Supp. II 2002). 
 
19
 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (Supp. II 2002). 
 
20
 8 U.S.C. § 1226a (Supp. II 2002). 
 
21
 31 U.S.C. § 5318(a)(3)–(4) (Supp. II 2002); McFeatters, supra note 17, at A6. 
 
22
 Editorial, Patriot Act Renewal, BALT. SUN, Oct. 5, 2005, at 12A. 
 
23
 18 U.S.C. § 2510 Note (Supp. II 2002) (Termination Date of 2001 Amend-
ment). 
 24 Bush Celebrates a Victory, Though Not an Easy One, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006, at 
A16.  The renewed Act contained several changes as compared to the original.  
Charles Babington, Congress Votes to Renew Patriot Act, With Changes, WASH. POST, Mar. 
8, 2006, at A3.  Libraries functioning in their traditional capacities are no longer sub-
ject to “National Security Letters,” which are subpoenas for financial and electronic 
records without a judge’s approval.  Id.  Recipients of subpoenas granted by the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court have the right to challenge the subpoena’s 
gag order requirements.  Id.  While most of the original provisions become perma-
nent, the roving wiretap provision and the government access to business records 
provision are again set to expire in four years.  Id. 
 25 See Elizabeth Bell, Real-Life Lessons Contra Costa and Tri-Valley Teachers Try to Tie 
Sept. 11 to Everyday Class Work, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 1, 2002, at 1. 
 26 See, e.g., Nat Hentoff, Fierce Watchdog of the Constitution, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 
12, 2003, at 24. 
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abused in prison.27  At its core, the argument espoused by advocates 
of protecting civil liberties is that surrendering individual rights in 
the name of increasing national security would entail giving up what 
it means to be an American.28 
B. Terrorist Attacks in London 
With the United States making a strong recovery after 9/11, the 
national mood quickly shifted from tense, patriotic fervor into a 
growing sense of complacency.  Although Americans regularly dealt 
with heightened terror alerts and news of terrorism in foreign coun-
tries, with each passing day when no 9/11-type events occurred lo-
cally, the feeling that the country was shielded from attacks was be-
ginning to creep back into the national psyche, even if only in the 
farthest reaches of America’s consciousness.29  Such was the psycho-
logical state of the American people when they learned of the Lon-
don terrorist attacks during the summer of 2005.30 
During the morning rush hour of July 7, 2005, a series of bombs 
exploded throughout London’s public transportation system, specifi-
cally three subway trains and a bus, killing at least thirty-seven people 
and injuring hundreds more.31  The attacks were the deadliest on the 
city since bombings by German airplanes during World War II32 and 
were eerily reminiscent of the 9/11 attacks, although not in terms of 
sheer magnitude.  Immediately, British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
blamed Islamic extremists, stating that they planned the attacks to co-
incide with the opening of the G-8 summit in Scotland, a gathering of 
leaders from eight of the world’s most economically powerful na-
tions.33 
 
 
27
 Thomas Powers, Liberty and Justice for Almost All, THE WKLY. STANDARD, June 16, 
2003, at 12. 
 28 See Hentoff, supra note 26, at 24. 
 29 See Evan Thomas & Stryker McGuire, Terror At Rush Hour, NEWSWEEK, July 18, 
2005, at 24. 
 30 See id. 
 
31
 Robert Barr, Terrorists Blast London 37 Dead, More than 700 Injured in Four Early 
Morning Bombings, BURLINGTON COUNTY TIMES, July 8, 2005, at 1. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id.  Member nations include the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Germany, 
the United States of America, Japan, Italy, and Canada.  G8 Gleneagles 2005 G8 
Background and History, http://www.g8.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename= 
OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1078995911932 (last visited Nov. 4, 
2006).  The G8 Summit is a gathering of the leaders of the member nations for the 
purpose of discussing major current issues and reaching informal agreements to 
reach their goals effectively.  G8 Gleneagles 2005 What is the G8 Summit?, 
http://www.g8.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage
&c=Page&cid=1078995913300 (last visited Nov. 4, 2006). 
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In the United States, the London bombings served to remind 
Americans that the battle with terrorism was still very close to home.  
The Office of Homeland Security raised the threat level to orange, or 
high-risk34 for mass transportation, added police officers, and in-
creased video surveillance, as well as inspections of trash bins and 
other potential hiding places for bombs.35  Major cities across the 
country added their own security measures.36  With these additional 
security measures, the London bombings triggered renewed fears in 
America that another 9/11 could happen at any moment. 
As London was recovering from the deadly bombings, just two 
weeks later on July 21, 2005, another series of blasts went off, again 
targeting three subway trains and a bus.37  This time, however, the 
bombs caused no injuries, apparently because they failed to explode 
properly.38  Speculation regarding potential suspects naturally fo-
cused on terrorists, with eyewitnesses reporting men on the subways 
and on the bus fiddling with knapsacks.39  If the message was not clear 
before, it was now, as both the Americans and the British—as well as 
the rest of the modern world—understood that no place was off lim-
its to terrorists. 
C. The New York City Police Department’s Random Bag Search Policy 
In response to the latest series of bombings in London, the city 
of New York, with other large cities paying close attention, took un-
 
 
34
 The Homeland Security Advisory System provides warnings in the form of a set 
of color-coded, graduated “Threat Conditions,” which correspond to varying levels of 
terrorist threats.  Homeland Security Presidential Directive–3, http://www.white 
house.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020312-5.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2007).  
There are five Threat Conditions: low (green), guarded (blue), elevated (yellow), 
high (orange), and severe (red).  Id.  The assignment of each Threat Condition trig-
gers the implementation of appropriate “Protective Measures.”  Id.  Under a high 
Threat Condition, federal departments and agencies should consider coordinating 
security efforts with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies; taking precau-
tions at public events, including cancellation; preparing to execute contingency pro-
cedures; and restricting access to threatened facilities.  Id. 
 
35
 Sara Kehaulani Goo & Dan Eggen, U.S. Increases Threat Level for Mass Transit, 
But Chertoff Says There Is No Sign of Imminent Attack, THE WASH. POST, July 8, 2005 at 
A18. 
 36 Id.  In New York, city officials placed police officers in every train during the 
morning commute and increased the number of police assigned to the transit system 
to 6000, about twice the normal amount  Id.  In Boston, subway system messages 
urged passengers to report suspicious activities, and in Chicago, city police used 
bomb-sniffing dogs to patrol the El.  Id. 
 
37
 Letta Tayler, London Blasts a Sober Reminder, ALBANY TIMES UNION, July 22, 2005, 
at A1. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
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precedented action by implementing a broad, city-wide random bag 
search policy in its subways.40  According to the NYPD, subway pas-
sengers are selected randomly but regularly.41  Police Commissioner 
Raymond Kelly stressed that search selections would not be based on 
race, ethnicity, or religion, with supervisors checking to make sure 
that the guidelines are being followed.42  The searches generally take 
place before passengers pass through the turnstiles, but the police re-
serve the right to conduct searches inside the subway system as well.43  
Passengers who are asked to be searched may refuse the search, but 
they then have to leave the subway station.44  The city provides ad-
vance notice about the searches, indicating beforehand at which sta-
tions the searches will take place.45  The searches, which focus on 
backpacks and containers large enough to hold explosives, ideally 
discourage subway riders from carrying backpacks and large bags in 
the subway system.46 
On August 4, 2005, the New York Civil Liberties Union 
(“NYCLU”), on behalf of five individual plaintiffs who are patrons of 
the New York subways, filed a lawsuit47 in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York against Police Commis-
sioner Kelly and the City of New York, seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that the random search policy is unconstitutional and an in-
junction against further enforcement of the policy.48  The NYCLU’s 
complaint alleged that the search policy is a violation of the Fourth49 
and Fourteenth50 Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.51  The problem, according to the NYCLU, lied in 
how the city configured the operations of the search policy.52  In sup-
port of its lawsuit, the NYCLU raised a number of points.53 
 
 
40
 Sewell Chan & Kareem Fahim, New York Starts to Inspect Bags on the Subways, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 22, 2005, at A1. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 See id. 
 46 See Chan & Fahim, supra note 40, at A1. 
 
47
 Complaint, MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05 Civ. 6921, 2005 WL 1943185 (S.D.N.Y 
Aug. 4, 2005) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
 48 Id. at 3–4. 
 
49
 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 
50
 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 
51
 Complaint, supra note 47, at 11. 
 52 See id. at 1–8. 
 53 Id. 
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First, the NYCLU asserted that the search policy is not likely to 
catch or deter terrorists because advance notice of searching is given, 
passengers selected for searches are free to walk away, and searches 
are conducted at a small proportion of the city’s subway entrances at 
any given time.54  Second, the NYCLU argued that the only people be-
ing searched are innocent passengers.55  The complaint points out 
that millions of people depend on the subway system and that many 
of these people carry bags, briefcases, and other such items in which 
they have an expectation of privacy.56  Third, the NYCLU contended 
that the search policy was not a response to any specific threat against 
the city.57  Fourth, the NYCLU claimed that the NYPD may search a 
passenger without having any suspicion that the passenger has en-
gaged in or will engage in any wrongdoing.58  Furthermore, the 
NYCLU believes the search policy creates the potential for impermis-
sible racial profiling.59  Since there is such a high volume of subway 
users, it is not realistic to expect that the NYPD will be able to adhere 
to a truly random search formula, such as one in every five passen-
gers.60  Rather, it is more likely that police will arbitrarily select pas-
sengers for searches, opening the door for racial profiling.61  Finally, 
the NYCLU suspects that police may be able to arrest a person after a 
search reveals that he or she has committed a crime.62  This may be 
problematic because searches and seizures by government actors are 
ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion.63  
Evidence obtained by unreasonable, and thus invalid, searches is 
prohibited from use in both federal64 and state65 courts. 
On December 2, 2005, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, in MacWade v. Kelly,66 issued its deci-
sion on the constitutionality of the NYPD’s search policy.  Judge 
Berman’s opinion held that the search policy is constitutional.67  On 
 
 54 Id. at 7–8. 
 55 Id. at 8. 
 56 Id. at 4–5. 
 
57
 Complaint, supra note 47, at 5. 
 58 Id. at 6. 
 59 Id. at 7. 
 60 See id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 8. 
 
63
 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997).  An exception to this general rule 
is the “special needs” doctrine.  See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
 
64
 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914). 
 
65
 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
 66 MacWade I, No. 05 Civ. 6921, 2005 WL 3338573 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005). 
 67 Id. at *1. 
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December 19, 2005, the NYCLU appealed the Southern District’s rul-
ing.68 
III.     ANALYSIS UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S  
SEARCH AND SEIZURE CLAUSE 
A. Introduction to the Fourth Amendment’s Search and Seizure 
Jurisprudence 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures.”69  The American colonists drafted 
the Fourth Amendment as a check against governmental intrusions 
into the peoples’ privacy, after years of unlimited intrusions by the 
British government.70  As the Supreme Court of the United States has 
recognized, the “central concern of the Fourth Amendment is to pro-
tect liberty and privacy from arbitrary and oppressive interference by 
government officials.”71 
For the search and seizure clause to apply, the following ele-
ments must exist: 1) governmental action,72 and 2) conduct that con-
stitutes either a search73 or a seizure.74  A search, for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment, is understood to mean a governmental invasion 
of a person’s privacy.75  However, not every invasion of privacy will 
constitute a search because only those invasions that intrude upon 
certain expectations of privacy will qualify for protection.76  The test 
 
 
68
 NYCLU appeals ruling on subway searches, http://www.nyclu.org/ 
mta_searches_suit_pr_121905.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2007).  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the southern district’s decision.  
MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 275 (2nd Cir. 2006) [hereinafter MacWade II]. 
 
69
 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The Fourth Amendment also provides for the proper 
issue of warrants, which must be based on probable cause.  Id.  However, obtaining a 
warrant is not a prerequisite for a reasonable search or seizure.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 20 (1968).  It is permissible to search or seize without a warrant or probable 
cause when doing so would be reasonable based on the circumstances.  Id. at 20–22.  
For example, the quick decisions and actions of police officers on the beat are gen-
erally not subject to the warrant procedure.  Id. at 20. 
 
70
 Denise Robinson, Supreme Court Review, Kaupp v. Texas: Breathing Life Into The 
Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 762 (2004) (citing Alan C. Yar-
cusko, Note, Brown to Payton to Harris: A Fourth Amendment Double Play by the Supreme 
Court, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 253, 257–58 (1992)). 
 
71
 United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975). 
 72 See, e.g., Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980). 
 73 See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984). 
 74 See, e.g., Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572–73 (1988). 
 75 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177–78. 
 76 Id. at 177. 
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for determining whether a privacy expectation is legitimate asks 
whether an individual has an actual subjective expectation of privacy 
and, then, whether that expectation is reasonable from society’s ob-
jective viewpoint.77  For example, curbside garbage does not receive 
Fourth Amendment protection because “[i]t is common knowledge 
that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are 
readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other 
members of the public,” and therefore, there is no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in those items.78  A seizure, under the Fourth 
Amendment, occurs “only if, in view of all of the circumstances sur-
rounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that 
he was not free to leave.”79  Circumstances indicating a potential sei-
zure include “the threatening presence of several officers, the display 
of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of 
the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that 
compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.”80  In Cali-
fornia v. Hodari D.,81 the Supreme Court of the United States clarified 
the definition of a seizure.  Justice Scalia explained that the condition 
of a reasonable person believing that he was not free to leave is nec-
essary, but not sufficient, to satisfy the test for a seizure.82  In narrow-
ing the scope of a seizure, the Court held that, with respect to a show 
of authority (as opposed to an application of physical force), there is 
no seizure if the subject does not yield.83 
B. Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures 
1. General Factors to Consider 
Although there are several factors that should be considered in 
determining whether a given search or seizure is reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment, the single most important factor may be the 
balance between privacy rights and governmental interests.  The Su-
preme Court of the United States has explained that “reasonableness 
. . . depends on a balance between the public interest and the indi-
vidual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by 
 
 
77
 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 
78
 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988). 
 
79
 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 
 80 Id. 
 
81
 499 U.S. 621 (1991). 
 82 Id. at 628. 
 83 Id. at 626.  Some states have rejected Hodari D. under their state constitutions.  
See, e.g., In re Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 780 (Minn. 1993); People v. Bora, 
634 N.E.2d 168, 169–70 (N.Y. 1994). 
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[the government].”84  Under the Supreme Court’s test, a search or 
seizure is reasonable if the government’s need for the search or sei-
zure outweighs the privacy interest in the intrusion upon the individ-
ual.85  In undertaking this balancing analysis, courts “must consider 
the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is con-
ducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is 
conducted.”86  The balancing analysis is not one that can be applied 
mechanically; rather, the test must be applied on a case-by-case ba-
sis.87 
A determination of reasonableness requires a court to consider 
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure in 
question.88  The Supreme Court, for the most part, has avoided using 
per se rules in the context of Fourth Amendment analysis.89  In United 
States v. Drayton,90 the Court considered whether police officers vio-
lated the defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights by boarding a bus to 
ask questions and conduct searches.91  In Drayton, three plainclothes 
police officers conducted a routine drug and weapons check of a 
Greyhound bus at a refueling stop.92  One of the officers walked down 
the bus aisle asking individual passengers about their plans and at-
tempting to match passengers with their luggage in the overhead 
racks.93  Passengers were free to leave the bus without argument at 
any time.94  During the course of this search, one of the officers asked 
the two defendants for permission to check their persons and both 
defendants consented.95  The defendants were arrested when the 
searches revealed that they were concealing drugs.96  The Court rea-
soned that, even though the searching officer did not expressly in-
form passengers of their right to refuse searches, the officer did ask 
for permission to check bags and persons, indicating to a reasonable 
 
 
84
 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). 
 85 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). 
 86 Id. 
 87 See id. 
 
88
 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002). 
 89 Id. 
 
90
 536 U.S. 194 (2002). 
 91 Id. at 197–200. 
 92 Id. at 197. 
 93 Id. at 198. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 199. 
 96 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 199. 
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person that he or she was free to refuse.97  Thus, finding that consent 
was voluntary, the Court held that the searches were reasonable.98 
In contrast to the totality-of-the-circumstances approach, the Su-
preme Court has also warned that undertaking case-by-case analyses 
of governmental need could open the door to litigation every time a 
dispute arises in the Fourth Amendment context.99  In Atwater v. City 
of Lago Vista,100 the petitioner was arrested for a seatbelt violation pur-
suant to a state law that authorized warrantless arrests for seatbelt vio-
lations.101  The Court rejected as impractical the petitioner’s argu-
ments that the validity of warrantless arrests should hinge on 
distinctions between major and minor crimes.102  In the Court’s opin-
ion, the key is to create “standards sufficiently clear and simple to be 
applied with a fair prospect of surviving judicial second-guessing 
months and years after an arrest or search is made.”103  The Court ex-
plained that a balancing-test analysis of a particular situation is un-
necessary when probable cause exists.104  Accordingly, the Court held 
that “[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual 
has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he 
may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the of-
fender.”105  As a prerequisite to individualized judicial review of a 
Fourth Amendment claim, the defendant must overcome the prefer-
ence for categorical treatment of such claims by “mak[ing] a color-
able argument that an arrest, with or without a warrant, was ‘con-
ducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to [his] 
privacy or even physical interests.’”106  Thus, the Court seems to reveal 
a preference for administrative convenience and practicality. 
In determining reasonableness, the courts distinguish between 
individualized searches and generalized schemes.107  The general rule 
is that a search or seizure is unreasonable if there is no suspicion 
against specific individuals.108  However, an exception may be made 
 
 97 Id. at 206. 
 98 Id. at 207. 
 99 See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001). 
 
100
 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
 101 Id. at 323–24. 
 102 Id. at 347–50. 
 103 Id. at 347. 
 104 Id. at 354. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 352–53 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 
(1996) (second alteration in original)). 
 107 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37–40 (2000). 
 108 Id. at 37. 
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for “intrusions undertaken pursuant to a general scheme without in-
dividualized suspicion.”109  For example, a highway checkpoint nor-
mally does not serve to stop individuals based on any specific suspi-
cion; but programmatic purposes, such as keeping the roads free of 
drunk drivers, may make the checkpoint constitutional.110  In United 
States v. Davis,111 a case involving an airport screening procedure, the 
Supreme Court explained that “searches conducted as part of a gen-
eral regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, 
rather than as part of a criminal investigation . . . may be permissible 
under the Fourth Amendment though not supported by a showing of 
probable cause.”112 
The Court may also utilize the “special needs” doctrine to justify 
searches that are conducted in the absence of individualized suspi-
cion.113  The court explained the doctrine by stating that “in the con-
text of safety and administrative regulations, a search unsupported by 
probable cause may be reasonable ‘when special needs, beyond the 
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-
cause requirement impracticable.’”114  For example, in Board of Educa-
tion v. Earls,115 the Court found that a special need existed in a public 
school district’s policy of drug testing students involved in extracur-
ricular activities because the state is responsible for maintaining their 
discipline, health, and safety.116 
Consent is another factor that may be considered in determin-
ing reasonableness.117  If an individual consents to a search or seizure, 
there is no need to address the question of reasonableness because 
the search or seizure is valid by virtue of the individual’s consent.118  
In order for valid consent to exist, the government does not necessar-
ily have to establish that the individual subject to search or seizure 
had express notice or knowledge of the right to refuse consent.119  
Valid consent can be established by showing, based upon a totality of 
the circumstances, that individuals could reasonably infer from the 
 
 109 Id. at 45–46. 
 
110
 Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). 
 
111
 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 112 Id. at 908. 
 
113
 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002) (quoting Nat'l Treasury Em-
ployees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989)). 
 114 Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)). 
 
115
 536 U.S. 822 (2002). 
 116 See id. at 829–32. 
 117 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2002). 
 118 See id. at 206. 
 119 Id. at 206–07. 
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situation that they were free to refuse consent.120  In Drayton—where 
the defendants gave express verbal consent for their bags and persons 
to be searched121—the police officers did not brandish any weapons, 
did not make any intimidating movements, left the aisle free for pas-
sengers to exit, and spoke to passengers individually in a polite 
voice.122  Based on these facts, the Supreme Court reasoned that the 
defendants’ consent was not coerced.123  The Court also supported 
the proposition that law enforcement officials may ask for consent to 
search, even when there is no apparent reason to be suspicious, if co-
operation is not coerced.124  Furthermore, the Court explained that a 
seizure does not occur where “a reasonable person would feel free to 
terminate the encounter.”125 
Another relevant factor with respect to reasonableness is the 
scope of a search or seizure.126  To determine whether the scope of 
the intrusion was within the standards of reasonableness, courts ask 
whether the search or seizure “was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”127  In 
the oft-cited case of Terry v. Ohio,128 the Supreme Court considered 
whether a police officer’s pat-down search and subsequent seizure of 
concealed weapons from individuals he deemed to have been acting 
suspiciously on the street were reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment.129  The Court, analyzing the scope of the search and seizure, 
applied an objective test: whether a man of reasonable caution would 
believe the officer’s actions were appropriate, given the facts available 
to the officer at that moment.130  Applying this standard, the Court 
concluded that the officer’s patting down of the individuals’ outer 
clothing was reasonable in scope in light of his justifiable belief, 
based on observable actions, that the men were armed.131  In later 
 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 198–99. 
 122 Id. at 203–04. 
 123 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 204. 
 124 Id. at 200–01. 
 125 Id. at 201. 
 
126
 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968). 
 127 Id. at 20. 
 
128
 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 129 Id. at 4–8. 
 130 Id. at 21–22. 
 131 Id. at 27–30.  Where two men were hanging out at a street corner, apparently 
not waiting for anyone or anything, and alternately walking up and down a street to 
peer into a store window about twenty-four times, it was reasonable for the officer to 
think that the individuals were planning a robbery and were thus armed.  Id. at 22–
23, 28.  The scope of the officer’s search was reasonable because it was justified by 
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cases, the Court also explained that the scope of a search is generally 
defined by the nature of the object sought and the places in which 
there is probable cause to believe it may be found.132 
One final point regarding the reasonableness of searches and 
seizures is the applicability of the plain view doctrine,133 which justifies 
a police officer’s warrantless seizure of an article of evidence in his 
plain view, if “the initial intrusion that [brought] the police within 
plain view of such . . . article is supported . . . by one of the recog-
nized exceptions to the warrant requirement.”134  The plain view doc-
trine is also applicable when a police officer “is not searching for evi-
dence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes 
across an incriminating object.”135  The doctrine should be under-
stood “as an extension of whatever the prior justification for an offi-
cer’s ‘access to an object’ may be.”136 
2. Examples of Legitimate Governmental Interests that 
Justify Suspicionless Searches and Seizures 
Generally, a governmental interest is legitimate if it is concerned 
with the public’s safety and welfare.  For example, highway safety is a 
valid governmental interest that arises in the context of searches and 
seizures occurring during highway checkpoint stops.137  In Michigan 
Department of State Police v. Sitz,138 the Supreme Court considered 
whether seizures in the form of state sobriety checkpoints were rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment.139  Holding that the check-
points were constitutional, the Supreme Court used a three-pronged 
test that balanced the governmental interest, the extent to which the 
checkpoint advanced that interest, and the individual privacy inter-
 
the desire to protect himself and others nearby.  Id. at 29.  In addition to limiting his 
search to a pat-down of the outer garments, the officer did not place his hands in the 
pockets or under the surface of the outer garments until he felt weapons.  Terry, 392 
U.S. at 29–30. 
 
132
 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (holding that permission to search 
car for narcotics included authority to search containers within the car); United 
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824–25 (1982) (holding that authorization to search car 
for contraband allowed officer to search every part of the vehicle and its contents). 
 133 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (“It is well established 
that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without 
a warrant.”). 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 466. 
 
136
 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983). 
 137 See, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449 (1990). 
 
138
 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
 139 Id. at 447. 
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est.140  The Court found that the prevention of drunken driving was a 
legitimate governmental interest,141 that sobriety checkpoints effec-
tively advanced that interest (1.5% arrest rate for one of the check-
points in question),142 and that intrusion into individual privacy was 
minimal (stops were brief and caused a minimal amount of fear and 
surprise in law abiding motorists).143  In Delaware v. Prouse,144 the Su-
preme Court provided an example of a constitutionally invalid high-
way seizure.145  The seizure in Prouse consisted of stopping a car on a 
public highway to check a driver’s license and vehicle registration, 
where there was no reason to believe the driver was violating any 
laws.146  Justice White supported the Court’s decision by explaining 
that “[t]he marginal contribution to roadway safety possibly resulting 
from a system of spot checks cannot justify subjecting every occupant 
of every vehicle on the roads to a seizure—limited in magnitude 
compared to other intrusions but nonetheless constitutionally cogni-
zable—at the unbridled discretion of law enforcement officials.”147  
The Court left open the possibility, however, that states could develop 
constitutional methods for spot checks “that do not involve the un-
constrained exercise of discretion[,]” such as “[q]uestioning of all 
oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops.”148 
The prevention of illegal immigration is another valid govern-
mental interest in the context of Fourth Amendment searches and 
seizures.  For example, in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,149 the Su-
preme Court held that fixed border patrol checkpoints—where the 
occupants of stopped vehicles are briefly detained for questioning, 
even though there is no reason to suspect that such vehicles would 
harbor illegal aliens—are constitutional under the Fourth Amend-
ment.150  The Court further held that such fixed checkpoints did not 
require prior authorization by judicial warrants.151  The Court also ac-
cepted giving a wide degree of discretion to Border Patrol officers 
 
 140 Id. at 448–49, 455 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50–51 (1979)). 
 141 Id. at 451. 
 142 Id. at 453–55. 
 143 Id. at 451–53. 
 
144
 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
 145 Id. at 663. 
 146 Id. at 650. 
 147 Id. at 661. 
 148 Id. at 663. 
 
149
 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
 150 Id. at 545. 
 151 Id. 
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with respect to the individuals selected for questioning, even if selec-
tions are based on apparent Mexican ancestry.152 
Although roadway checkpoints set up to promote highway safety 
and to prevent illegal immigration are constitutional, checkpoints 
may not be operated as a general crime control measure.153  In City of 
Indianapolis v. Edmond,154 the Supreme Court held that the city’s 
checkpoint program violated the Fourth Amendment “[b]ecause the 
primary purpose . . . [was] ultimately indistinguishable from the gen-
eral interest in crime control. . . .”155  The city’s checkpoint program 
conducted roadblocks for the purpose of intercepting the transporta-
tion of illegal drugs.156  Although the program was relatively success-
ful,157 the relevant issue for the Court was the reasonableness of the 
seizures under the Fourth Amendment.158  The Court refused to dis-
pense with the general rule that individualized suspicion be present 
for seizures, stating that “[the court] cannot sanction stops justified 
only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation 
and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed 
some crime.”159  In considering the reasonableness of suspicionless 
checkpoints operated pursuant to a general scheme of law enforce-
ment, purpose becomes a relevant issue, and in Edmond, the court 
found that drug interdiction falls under the impermissible category 
of general crime control.160 
Crime control may be a permissible aim, however, if the check-
point is designed to apprehend individuals connected to very specific 
and known crimes.161  In Illinois v. Lidster,162 the Supreme Court held 
that a highway checkpoint stop organized for the purpose of investi-
gating a recent fatal crime was constitutional.163  The court applied 
the three-pronged balancing test164 enunciated in Brown v. Texas:165 1) 
the seizure advanced a grave public concern (finding the perpetrator 
 
 152 Id. at 563–64. 
 
153
 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–42 (2000). 
 
154
 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
 155 Id. at 48. 
 156 Id. at 34–35. 
 157 See id.  The arrest rate at the checkpoints was approximately nine percent.  Id. 
 158 Id. at 37. 
 159 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44. 
 160 Id. 
 161 See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427–28 (2004). 
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 540 U.S. 419 (2004). 
 163 Id. at 427–28. 
 164 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1990) (citing 
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50–51 (1979)); see supra text accompanying note 140. 
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of a specific crime); 2) the seizure significantly advanced this grave 
public concern (police were able to obtain information from drivers, 
some of whom may have seen something relevant); and 3) the intru-
sion into personal liberty rights was very minimal (individuals waited 
a few minutes in line and had a few seconds of contact with the po-
lice).166  Thus, the balancing analysis weighed in favor of a finding 
that the checkpoint stop in Lidster was reasonable and, therefore, con-
stitutional.167 
An interesting area of Fourth Amendment law, due to the exi-
gencies of modern society, is found in the realm of airport security.  
In United States v. Marquez,168 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit held that random airport searches that subject pas-
sengers to handheld magnetometer wand scans are constitutional 
under the Fourth Amendment.169  Airport screening searches are not 
considered crime control searches, but rather administrative searches 
designed to deter passengers from carrying weapons or explosives 
and to stop them if they actually do carry weapons or explosives.170  
The test for reasonableness of airport screening searches considers 
whether: 1) the search is “‘no more extensive or intensive than neces-
sary, in light of current technology, to detect weapons or explosives; 
2) it is confined in good faith to that purpose; and 3) passengers may 
avoid the search by electing not to fly.’”171  In Marquez, the Ninth Cir-
cuit, as other courts have done,172 found that random metal detector 
scans of persons are reasonably necessary and not overly intrusive 
given the interests at stake.173  The court reasoned that “the random-
ness of the selection for the additional screening procedure arguably 
increases the deterrent effects of airport screening procedures be-
cause potential passengers may be influenced by their knowledge that 
they may be subject to random, more thorough screening proce-
dures.”174  The court also added that the validity of airport screening 
 
 166 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427–28. 
 167 Id.  
 
168
 410 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 169 Id. at 614. 
 170 Id. at 616–17. 
 171 Id. at 616 (quoting Torbet v. United Airlines, Inc., 298 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th 
Cir. 2002)). 
 172 E.g., United States v. Doe, 61 F.3d 107, 109–10 (1st Cir. 1995) (“Routine secu-
rity searches at airport checkpoints pass constitutional muster because the compel-
ling public interest in curbing air piracy generally outweighs their limited intrusive-
ness.”). 
 173 Marquez, 410 F.3d at 617. 
 174 Id. 
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searches depends upon the recognition of an individual’s right not to 
be searched—by not boarding the plane.175 
Although the Supreme Court has never decided a case involving 
a search or seizure program designed primarily as an anti-terrorism 
measure, presumably, combating and deterring terrorist attacks—
since such interests fall under the broader category of public safety 
and welfare—is a legitimate governmental interest.  Notably, in Ed-
mond, Justice O’Connor wrote in dicta that “an appropriately tailored 
roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack” would be 
valid under the Fourth Amendment.176 
C. Constitutional Analysis of the NYPD’s Search Policy Under the 
Search and Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment 
Initially, a court must address whether the NYPD’s random bag 
checks constitute searches and/or seizures within the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment.  Since subway passengers are free to walk away 
from bag checks and are given advance notice of checks, thus avoid-
ing the possibility of being checked, it seems that these bag checks do 
not constitute seizures.177  With respect to the question of whether 
these checks are searches, however, the answer is clearly yes.  Since 
the bag checks of subway passengers are handled by NYPD officers 
and are authorized by the city, the government action requirement is 
satisfied,178 and since the bag checks are governmental invasions of 
individual privacy, they constitute searches.179 
A more difficult question is whether subway passengers have a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in their belongings so that the bag 
checks fall within the reach of the Fourth Amendment.180  There is lit-
tle doubt that passengers—at least some of them—have individual 
subjective expectations of privacy, as evidenced by the NYCLU’s law-
suit on behalf of five individual subway riders.181  It is also easy to un-
derstand that this expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable 
 
 175 Id. (citing United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910–11 (9th Cir. 1973)). 
 
176
 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000). 
 177 See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002); supra note 125 and ac-
companying text. 
 178 See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980); supra note 72 and ac-
companying text. 
 179 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177–78 (1984); supra note 75 and ac-
companying text. 
 180 See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177; supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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 Complaint, supra note 47, at 8–11.  Plaintiffs were offended by the search and 
felt that it was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.  Id. 
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from society’s standpoint.182  Often, the reason that people keep per-
sonal belongings and items in bags, briefcases, purses, and backpacks 
is precisely because those items are private in nature.  It is reasonable 
to expect that such privacy will be maintained while traveling in pub-
lic places.  Therefore, since the NYPD’s random bag checks clearly 
constitute searches, they fall within the ambit of the Fourth Amend-
ment’s search and seizure clause. 
The next phase of the Fourth Amendment analysis is to balance 
the governmental interest with the individual privacy interests and 
determine whether the random search policy advances the govern-
ment’s interest.183  Here, the governmental interest is a public safety 
concern, preventing and deterring terrorism.  This is certainly a le-
gitimate and very serious governmental interest since millions of hu-
man lives, as well as tremendous amounts of personal and public 
property, are at stake.  In comparison, the burden on the individual 
privacy interest is minimal.  Subway passengers selected for searches 
will ordinarily have to sacrifice a few seconds of their time and a cou-
ple minutes at the most.  This is reasonable in light of the fact that 
the searches are supposed to prevent the very serious threat of terror-
ism. 184  Presumably, the manner in which the searches are conducted 
is also reasonable.185  This is not a case of overly hostile police officers 
subjecting passengers to outright humiliation by conducting strip 
searches, which are ordinarily unreasonable absent special circum-
stances,186 or even pat-down searches.187  Rather, the police officers 
look briefly into selected bags and then allow the passengers to move 
on.188  Even if the intrusion into privacy was more than minimally 
burdensome, however, some courts would still find in favor of rea-
sonableness.  In United States v. Bell,189 a Second Circuit case involving 
 
 182 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); su-
pra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 183 Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1990) (citing Brown v. 
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50–51 (1979)); supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 184 See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427–28 (2004) (upholding the validity 
of a highway checkpoint designed to apprehend perpetrators of a specific crime 
where stops were for a few minutes at most); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 
U.S. 543, 546–47 (1976) (upholding the validity of fixed border patrol checkpoints 
where average length of stop is three to five minutes). 
 185 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 186 See, e.g., State v. Stevens, 495 A.2d 910, 914 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984). 
 187 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 4–8; supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 
188
 Tom Hays, NYPD Implements Random Bag Search on City’s Subways, July 22, 2005, 
http://www.securityinfowatch.com/online/The-Latest/NYPD-Implements-Random-
Bag-Search-on-Citys-Subways/4946SIW306. 
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 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972). 
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an airport search, Chief Judge Friendly, in a concurring opinion, ex-
pressed his belief that: 
[w]hen the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and 
millions of dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing 
up of a large airplane, the danger alone meets the test of reason-
ableness, so long as the search is conducted in good faith for the 
purpose of preventing hijacking or like damage and with reason-
able scope and the passenger has been given advance notice of his 
liability to such a search so that he can avoid it by choosing not to 
travel by air.
190
 
The balance between the governmental interest in preventing 
terrorism and the individual privacy interest weighs in favor of the 
governmental interest.  However, the more difficult issue is whether 
the NYPD’s random search policy meaningfully advances that gov-
ernmental interest.191  The trouble with this issue is that there is no 
way to know for sure that the search policy is working, even if it is 
successful.  To illustrate, suppose that, back in June 2005, a terrorist 
was planning to execute a suicide-bombing mission in the subway sys-
tem.  After the city announces its random search policy for the sub-
ways, the terrorist abandons his plans.  This is an example where the 
search policy met its goal of deterring terrorism, but there is no way 
for an outsider to know about this success unless he personally knew 
the terrorist.  Even if one could know about such accounts of deter-
rence realized, it is not clear at what rate such realizations would have 
to occur to qualify the search policy as worthwhile.  Arrest rates may 
be relevant in this analysis.  For example, if one in every 10,000 pas-
sengers is caught with explosives, the question is whether that is 
enough to proclaim that the governmental interest is being ad-
vanced.  On the other hand, arrest rates probably are not an accurate 
measure of the search policy’s success because such statistics do not 
take into account the effect of deterrence.  With respect to deter-
rence, given the nature of the search policy, it is difficult to say 
whether the searches indeed deter terrorists.  After all, at any given 
time, many subway stations are not subject to random searches, and 
those that are subject to searches provide advance notice.192 
Although there are doubts about the effectiveness of the NYPD’s 
search policy, notwithstanding the difficulty in measuring with any 
certainty the degree to which random searches advance the city’s in-
 
 190 Id. at 675 (Friendly, C.J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
 191 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1990) (citing 
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50–51 (1979)); supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 
192
 Complaint, supra note 47, at 1–2. 
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terest in preventing terrorist attacks, the searches are still reasonable 
because the intrusion into privacy rights is so minimal compared to 
the risk of terrorism.  The prudent course of action in a situation 
such as this is to adopt Judge Friendly’s approach.193  Since the 
stakes—potentially millions of human lives—are so high, even if the 
search policy deters or prevents only one serious terrorist attack over 
a span of several years, the better viewpoint is to suppose as true that 
the policy advances the governmental interest.  In doing so, a totality-
of-the-circumstances approach is taken.  Reasonableness is judged by 
looking at the big picture, in terms of both time span and space.  
Considering that New York City will likely be a prime terrorist target 
well into the future, in light of the current geo-political climate in 
which Americans live, stopping a percentage of subway riders for 
brief bag checks is really not too much to ask. 
Two other factors weigh in favor of reasonableness.  First, subway 
passengers have the right to refuse consent to the searches.194  If a 
passenger is selected for a search and the passenger objects, he or she 
is free to simply walk away at the cost of not boarding the subway 
train at that particular station.195  Since passengers have knowledge of 
the right to refuse consent, if they submit to searches, they will be 
presumed to have voluntarily consented to those searches.  This is 
significant because voluntary consent weighs in favor of a valid 
search,196 and seizures of evidence found in the course of a valid 
search are reasonable.197  Second, the programmatic purpose of de-
terring terrorism is relevant here.198  The general rule that individual-
ized suspicion justify each search is inapplicable here because such a 
requirement renders a random search policy aimed at stopping ter-
rorism completely unworkable.199  Furthermore, searches undertaken 
 
 193 See Bell, 464 F.2d at 675 (Friendly, C.J., concurring); supra note 190 and ac-
companying text. 
 194 Chan & Fahim, supra note 40, at A1. 
 195 Id. 
 196 See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206–08 (2002) (finding that police 
officers could proceed with search where there was voluntary consent). 
 197 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971); supra note 134 and ac-
companying text.  Furthermore, seizures of evidence related to non-terrorist crimes, 
such as drugs or weapons, will be reasonable pursuant to the plain view doctrine.  See 
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466; supra note 135 and accompanying text.  The NYCLU was 
clearly concerned about this issue.  See Complaint, supra note 47, at 8; supra note 62 
and accompanying text. 
 198 See Mich. Dep’t. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990); supra note 110 
and accompanying text. 
 199 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45–46 (2000); supra note 109 
and accompanying text. 
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pursuant to a generalized scheme are permissible.200  In fact, the 
NYPD’s random search policy is similar to screening procedures im-
plemented at major airports, which are, of course, valid.201  Both pro-
cedures seek to prevent and deter terrorism, and both procedures 
occur at mass transportation centers open to the public.  The major 
difference is that subway systems are used for relatively quick intra-
city commutes, whereas airports are used for flying much greater dis-
tances.  The nature of air travel and the logistics of airport operations 
allow for search procedures that subject all passengers to security 
measures.  This is not currently possible in the New York City subway 
system.  Searching every single passenger, though a much more effec-
tive deterrent than the current policy, would create a logjam at sub-
way stations and bring the city to a grinding halt.  This is why random 
searches must suffice. 
Considering the various factors at play here—the serious gov-
ernmental interest in preventing and deterring terrorism, the mini-
mal intrusion on individual privacy rights, the risk that even one act 
of terrorism could cost unacceptable numbers of human lives and 
economic damage, the fact that individuals have the right to refuse 
consent, and the programmatic purpose of the policy—the NYPD’s 
random search policy is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
D. MacWade v. Kelly 
1. The District Court’s Decision 
After a two-day bench trial held on October 31 and November 1, 
2005, the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York ruled on December 2, 2005 that the NYPD’s random search 
policy202 is constitutional.203  At the outset, Judge Richard M. Berman 
noted some important findings of fact.204  First, the New York City 
subway system operates twenty-four hours a day and is the largest and 
most used subway system in the United States.205  Second, based on 
the testimony of city officials, the threat of a terrorist attack in New 
 
 200 See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45–46 (2000); supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 201 See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973); supra note 112 and 
accompanying text. 
 
202
 The court refers to the random search policy as the “Container Inspection Pro-
gram.”  MacWade I, No. 05 Civ. 6921, 2005 WL 3338573, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005). 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. at *3–*15. 
 205 Id. at *4. 
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York City’s subways is real and substantial.206  Third, the city of New 
York implemented the random search policy to “address the threat of 
an explosive device being taken into the subway system in a carry-on 
container, as had occurred in . . . London.”207  Finally, the court, giv-
ing deference to city officials and their expert witnesses, found the 
random search policy to be an effective measure for deterring terror-
ism.208 
The court began its constitutional discussion by establishing the 
“special needs” doctrine as its legal analytical framework.209  Judge 
Berman explained the essence of the doctrine by asserting that when 
“the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless 
searches calibrated to the risk may rank as ‘reasonable’—for exam-
ple, searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and 
other official buildings.”210  The judge then enunciated the appropri-
ate standard of analysis under the Fourth Amendment when a special 
need exists: “a fact-specific balancing of the intrusion . . . against the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”211 
In the first part of the court’s analysis, Judge Berman found that 
the NYPD’s random search policy addressed a special need—the 
need to decrease the real and substantial public safety risk of a terror-
ist attack on the subways.212  Citing Edmond, Judge Berman distin-
guished between a general interest in crime control and the need to 
go beyond ordinary law enforcement.213  The judge believed that the 
search policy was designed for the special purpose of keeping explo-
sives out of the subway, rather than crime control in general, by 
 
 206 Id.  According to Michael Sheehan, the NYPD’s Deputy Commissioner for 
Counter-Terrorism, transportation systems are attractive targets for terrorists for the 
following reasons: 1) potential for high casualties due to high volume of people, 2) 
disruption to all or part of transportation system, 3) serious economic consequences, 
and 4) public fear and demoralization.  Id.  The London bombings in July 2005 were 
cause for concern regarding New York City’s subways because they were carried out 
by members of groups with links to similar groups in New York, and they were car-
ried out notwithstanding a substantial security system.  MacWade I, 2005 WL 3338573, 
at *4.  
 207 Id. at *5.  The city was also aware of the 2004 Madrid and Moscow bombings in 
public transportation systems.  Id. at *4–*5. 
 208 Id. at *11. 
 209 Id. at *16; see supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 210 Id. (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997)). 
 211 MacWade I, 2005 WL 3338573, at *16 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 
822, 830 (2002)). 
 212 Id. at *17. 
 213 Id. (citing Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37–38, 47–48); see supra note 155 and accompa-
nying text. 
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pointing to the facts that passengers had advance notice and could 
leave the subway system to avoid searches.214 
Next, the court found that the random search policy was a rea-
sonably effective measure for furthering the compelling governmen-
tal interest of preventing a terrorist bombing of the New York City 
subway system.215  As support for the finding of a compelling govern-
mental interest, Judge Berman emphasized that there is an extremely 
serious interest in preserving human life.216  In determining that the 
random search policy was a reasonably effective measure of further-
ing the governmental interest, Judge Berman cautioned that the pol-
icy only has to be a reasonable method—not the most effective 
method—for preventing terrorism in order to survive constitutional 
scrutiny.217  On this point, the court reasoned that the uncertainty 
and randomness associated with the selection of searches helped 
generate a reasonably effective means of deterring terrorists.218 
Finally, the court determined that the random search policy in-
truded only minimally on the privacy interests of subway passen-
gers.219  Judge Berman pointed out that the Fourth Amendment does 
not require that a search be the least intrusive search possible.220  
Rather, the key is whether there is a close and substantial relation be-
tween the governmental interest and the means employed to further 
that interest.221  In finding that the random search policy met this 
standard, the court listed four reasons supporting the conclusion that 
privacy interests were only minimally invaded.222  First, passengers are 
given advance notice of searches.223  Second, searches are conducted 
openly so that police officers have limited discretion in selecting pas-
sengers for searches except to determine whether a bag is large 
enough to carry an explosive.224  Third, passengers selected for 
searches have the choice to refuse the search and walk away.225  
Fourth, the searches are properly limited in scope and duration be-
 
 214 MacWade I, 2005 WL 3338573, at *17. 
 215 Id. at *17–*18. 
 216 Id. at *17. 
 217 Id. (citing Mollica v. Volker, 229 F.3d 366, 370 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
 218 Id. at *18. 
 219 Id. at *19. 
 220 MacWade I, 2005 WL 3338573, at *19 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 
837 (2002)). 
 221 Id. (citing United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 192 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
 222 Id.  
 223 Id. 
 224 Id.  
 225 Id.  
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cause officers may look only for bags or containers capable of holding 
explosives and may open or manipulate the contents of the bags or 
containers only if necessary.226 
Balancing the relevant interests, the court held that since the 
random search policy reasonably advanced the vitally important gov-
ernmental interest of preventing terrorism in the subways while only 
minimally intruding upon privacy, the search policy is valid.227 
2. The Second Circuit’s Decision 
On August 11, 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, agreeing that 
the search policy is a reasonable means of addressing a special 
need.228  Before undertaking the reasonableness analysis under the 
special needs doctrine, the court addressed two initial concerns.229  
First, the court held that the doctrine does not require that an indi-
vidual subject to a special needs search possess a reduced privacy in-
terest.230  Rather, the individual privacy interest is a factor to be con-
sidered in the balancing analysis.231  Second, the court reiterated that 
the search policy does indeed serve a special need—that of protecting 
the public from a terrorist attack.232 
The heart of the court’s opinion came in the balancing of four 
factors—governmental interest, individual privacy interest, intrusive-
ness of the search, and effectiveness of the search—to determine the 
reasonableness of the search policy under the Fourth Amendment.233  
First, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court that the gov-
ernment’s interest in preventing terrorism is immediate and substan-
tial.234  Second, the court stated that subway passengers have a full ex-
pectation of privacy in their containers.235  Third, the court found the 
searches minimally intrusive.236  Finally, the court determined that the 
 
 226 MacWade I, 2005 WL 3338573, at *19. 
 227 Id. at *20. 
 228 MacWade II, 460 F.3d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 229 Id. at 269–71. 
 230 Id. at 270. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. at 271. 
 233 Id. at 271–75. 
 234 MacWade II, 460 F.3d  at 271–72. 
 235 Id. at 272–73. 
 236 Id. at 273.  The court listed the following reasons to support its finding: 1) ad-
vance notice of searches; 2) limitation of searches to containers capable of hiding 
explosives; 3) shortness of searches; 4) openness of the searches, which reduces fear 
and stigma associated with searches in hidden areas; and 5) lack of discretion by po-
lice in choosing whom to search.  Id. 
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searches were a reasonably effective means of preventing and deter-
ring terrorism, giving considerable deference to the judgment of law 
enforcement authorities.237  Balancing these factors, the Second Cir-
cuit concluded that the search policy is reasonable, and therefore 
constitutional.238 
IV.     THE SEARCH POLICY’S WEAKNESSES 
A. The Search Policy Is Not Likely to Deter Terrorists 
A serious flaw with the NYPD’s random search policy is that it is 
unlikely to significantly deter, or even catch, potential terrorists.  Ac-
cepting the allegations in the NYCLU’s complaint as true, “the NYPD 
is not conducting searches at most subway entrances at any given 
time,” and advance notice is given at those stations where searches 
are being conducted.239  Thus, it is easy to see why the NYCLU would 
characterize the random search program as “virtually certain neither 
to catch any person trying to carry explosives into the subway system 
nor to deter such an effort.”240  If a terrorist wanted to carry out an at-
tack in the subways and approached a subway station that was con-
ducting searches, he could leave based on the advance notice or by 
walking away from a search if selected.  Then, he would simply have 
to find his way to one of the many entrances not being searched at 
that time.  Furthermore, since police officers supposedly select indi-
viduals for searches at regular intervals, such as one in every five,241 a 
terrorist could just take his chances at a subway station where 
searches were being conducted and still avoid detection.  The prob-
lem with this is obvious: “[A] terrorist wired up like a human com-
puter might easily stroll into a train car just so long as he hits the in-
terval right.  But a grandma from Great Neck or a Wall Street lawyer 
from Roslyn could wind up getting the works from the cops.”242  Thus, 
the arbitrary nature of the searches and the fact that the searches are 
easily avoidable without sacrificing entry into the subway system 
means that terrorists are probably not deterred in any significant way. 
 
 237 Id. at 273–75. 
 238 Id. at 275. 
 
239
 Complaint, supra note 47, at 1–2. 
 240 Id. at 2. 
 
241
 Paul Sperry, It's the Age of Terror: What Would You Do?, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2005, 
at A25. 
 242 The Limits of Safety: How Might Random Checks Stop an Intent Suicidal Jihadist? 
NEWSDAY (New York), July 30, 2005, at A48. 
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B. The Net Effect of the Search Policy Is to Inconvenience Subway 
Passengers 
Since the search policy in and of itself probably does not and will 
not deter potential terrorists, the overall effect of the searches is to 
inconvenience innocent subway passengers.  With the subway system 
congested as it is, the searches have the potential to increase over-
crowding and make commute times even longer, potentially decreas-
ing worker productivity.  At the least, the city may be wasting political 
capital on what is viewed by some as a futile policy that will undoubt-
edly raise the ire of a few subway passengers.  Understandably, many 
commuters have voiced their displeasure.  Troy Dowdy of Yonkers, 
New York had this to say about the searches: “This is a way for them 
to take away our liberty . . . .  Tell everybody to read George Orwell’s 
1984 to figure out what’s going on.  . . . It gives the illusion that we 
are safe.”243  David Brown, visiting in New York, stated that the 
searches “created more anxiety and paranoia than safety.”244  Some 
subway riders seemed upset more because of the inconvenience fac-
tor than the intrusion into privacy rights.  Andrew Morris, a New 
Yorker, explained how the searches would test the patience of com-
muters: “Sometimes you need to get to an appointment, you’re run-
ning late and a cop stops you to delay you even further?  That’s going 
to create a mess.”245 
C. The Search Policy Results in a Potentially Inefficient Allocation of 
Manpower 
Another problem with the search policy, not immediately obvi-
ous, is the potentially inefficient allocation of law enforcement per-
sonnel for conducting random subway searches.  Neysa Pranger, 
campaign coordinator for the New York Public Interest Research 
Group Straphangers’ Campaign, a subway riders’ advocacy group, 
states that “the MTA and the NYPD could be doing better things with 
their time,” and “[the random searches are] going to do very little to 
help deter an attack.”246  Assuming the random subway searches are 
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 Ainsley O'Connell & James Fanelli, NYPD Begins Searching Bags of Transit Riders, 
NEWSDAY (New York), July 22, 2005, available at http://www.newsday.com/news/ 
nationworld/world/nyc-secu0722,0,2113455.story. 
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 245 Random Bag Searches Begin at N.Y. Subway, BALTIMORE SUN, July 22, 2005, avail-
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not acting as a meaningful deterrent, the NYPD officers may be de-
voting an excessive amount of time to an effort that may ultimately be 
fruitless.  Rather than being stuck in the subways, these officers could 
be assigned to more valuable law enforcement tasks that would result 
in activities more likely to have an effect on crime control or other 
law enforcement purposes.  Thus, reallocation of police officers 
could result in a better use of taxpayer money.  Due to budgetary 
constraints, the inefficient use of taxpayer funds is a major cause for 
concern because it could conceivably preclude implementation of 
better anti-terrorism measures. 
V. POSSIBLE CHANGES 
A. Changes Within the Search Policy 
The goal of any modification to the NYPD’s random search pol-
icy should be to maximize security while minimizing inconvenience 
and intrusion into the privacy of subway riders.  With this goal in 
mind, this Comment proposes potential changes that would address 
some of the current policy’s weaknesses. 
The first change is the elimination of advance notice at subway 
stations that are conducting searches.247  This would remove the pos-
sibility that terrorists could avoid searches just by observing posted 
notices.  Although a small step, eliminating advance notice is a step in 
the direction of making the search policy a more meaningful tool in 
the fight against terrorism.  A problem that this modification presents 
is whether the search policy would remain constitutional after im-
plementation.  Although implementation of this change may weigh 
on the side of unreasonableness under the Fourth Amendment,248 it is 
unlikely to affect the constitutionality of the policy as a whole.  This is 
because the right to refuse consent still permits terrorists, and every-
one else, to avoid being searched by turning around and leaving the 
subway station.249 
Another potential change is to conduct the searches on a much 
larger scale at any given time.  Currently, anyone who wants to avoid 
being searched while still riding the subway can do so by simply find-
ing an entrance where searches are not being conducted.  By dra-
matically increasing the scale of the searches to extend to most, if not 
all, subway stations at any given time, the road to circumventing the 
 
 247 See supra text accompanying note 45. 
 248 See supra text accompanying notes 219–223. 
 249 See supra text accompanying note 44. 
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searches would be much narrower.  This would cause the search pol-
icy to be a much more meaningful deterrent than it is now.  However, 
feasibility is an issue with implementing such a change due to the ex-
tremely high costs involved.  William W. Millar, president of the 
American Public Transportation Association, feels that conducting 
searches on a comprehensive scale is virtually impossible, and he 
states that “[i]f you were going to try to check a very high percentage 
at every station or on every train, it would be incredibly labor-
intensive.”250 
A very controversial change, but nonetheless one that has its fair 
share of supporters, is to allow some degree of racial profiling in the 
search selection process.  It is common knowledge, or at least com-
monly believed, that young Muslim men were responsible for both 
the 9/11 attacks and the London bombings.251  The politically correct 
approach is to agree with New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg in 
declaring that it is impossible to predict what a terrorist looks like, 
but not everyone agrees.252  If terrorists are most likely to be Muslim 
men of Arab or South Asian descent, then it seems logical to take a 
closer look at individuals who fit that description.253  Although critics 
of racial profiling say it is prejudicial,254 if done properly, it is possible 
that racial profiling would subject relatively few young men of Arab 
or South Asian descent to searches.255  The key to proper racial profil-
ing is to be as specific as possible with profile descriptions.256  A well-
designed system of racial profiling would also consider suspicious be-
havior, in addition to the traditional profile elements.257  Given the 
sensitivity and controversy surrounding racial profiling, it would be-
hoove police officers to profile politely and respectfully.258  Politicians 
and government officials must be careful in how they advocate racial 
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 Chan & Fahim, supra note 40, at A1. 
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 Sperry, supra note 241, at A25. 
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 Fred Lucas, The Right Way to Profile in NYC, FRONTPAGEMAGAZINE.COM, Aug. 17, 
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profiling so as not to unnecessarily arouse animosity towards the gov-
ernment in targeted segments of the population.  Since there is evi-
dence that suggests many Arab-Americans would actually support ad-
ditional scrutiny of people with Middle Eastern features or accents,259 
the government can build upon this good will.  Another way to offset 
potential charges of prejudice is to search at least one person not of 
Arab or South Asian descent for every person of Arab or South Asian 
descent searched.260  Finally, it is important to remember that, despite 
the potential utility of racial profiling, the advantage of profiling is 
severely limited if terrorists respond by simply changing their “pro-
file.”261  In fact, there are reports that Islamic terrorists have already 
started to recruit Europeans to fool profilers.262 
Even if city officials agreed that racial profiling is desirable in 
random bag searches, there are some serious obstacles to overcome 
in implementing it.  Obviously, law enforcement officials must be very 
careful with racial profiling because of the potential for intentional 
abuse and even innocent mistakes.  For example, during July of 2005, 
an innocent Brazilian man, who apparently looked Asian,263 was shot 
and killed by British police who believed he was involved with the 
London bombings.264  The potential for abuse and mistakes with ra-
cial profiling, however, should not cause city authorities to quickly 
dismiss the idea.  With the appropriate measures, abuse and human 
error may be sufficiently minimized so that society would be willing to 
accept the risks of racial profiling in exchange for the benefits.  The 
hard part is to develop and implement such measures.  One possible 
method for effectuating proper racial profiling is to train police offi-
cers to detect Muslim terrorists, not simply a Muslim person.  This 
would likely require coordinating the efforts of terrorism experts and 
high-level federal or state officials to equip police officers with the 
requisite knowledge to profile based on race.  High-level officials 
 
 259 Id.  The author cited a poll of 527 local Arab-Americans by the Detroit Free 
Press, which revealed that sixty-one percent of Arab-Americans supported extra scru-
tiny of people with Middle Eastern features or accents.  Id. 
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 261 See Clarence Page, Editorial, Only Smart Profiling Makes Sense, BALT. SUN, Aug. 
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would share specific and credible intelligence that would describe in 
detail the appearances of actual individuals suspected of being terror-
ists.  Terrorism experts would train officers with respect to protocol 
in certain situations—how to approach the suspect, how to maintain 
public safety, etc.  The challenges in implementing such a program 
include cost and overcoming political unpopularity. 
Another obstacle in implementing racial profiling is the issue of 
doing so while retaining the constitutionality of the search policy.  
With respect to the Fourth Amendment, the central requirement re-
mains reasonableness.265  In light of this standard, proper racial profil-
ing as described above is likely to withstand constitutional challenges.  
Racial profiling would further a compelling governmental interest 
(deterring terrorist attacks in the New York City subway system)266 
with a minimal invasion of privacy (individuals would be searched 
only if their profiles closely matched specific and credible profiles of 
known suspects).267  Considering the totality of the circumstances268—
we live with the constant and real threat of terrorism—proper racial 
profiling seems reasonable.  Furthermore, if searches and seizures 
based on racial profiling are valid in the Fourth Amendment context, 
then the fact that a given police officer is also subjectively motivated 
by racial considerations by itself does not invalidate the search or sei-
zure.269  Even if racial profiling is valid under the Fourth Amendment, 
it must still withstand challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.270  Since racial profiling can be classified 
as an explicitly racial policy, it is subject to strict scrutiny review by the 
courts.271  Therefore, to pass constitutional challenge, the racial pro-
 
 265 See, e.g., Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001). 
 266 See MacWade I, No. 05 Civ. 6921, 2005 WL 3338573, at *17–*18 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 
7, 2005); see supra text accompanying note 215. 
 267 See supra note 256 and accompanying text; see generally Mich. Dep’t of State Po-
lice v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1990) (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50–51 
(1979)) (explaining three-pronged test that balances governmental interest, extent 
to which seizure advances that interest, and individual privacy interest); supra note 
140 and accompanying text. 
 268 See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002); supra note 88 and ac-
companying text. 
 269 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 339 n.2 (2000) (“The parties 
properly agree that the subjective intent of the law enforcement officer is irrelevant 
in determining whether that officer's actions violate the Fourth Amendment.”). 
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filing policy must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling gov-
ernmental interest.272 
As discussed above, the governmental interest is clearly compel-
ling.  The question is whether the policy of racial profiling, as de-
scribed above, is narrowly tailored to further that interest.273  It seems 
that a strong case could be made that it is.274  Assuming that it is pos-
sible, based on physical appearance, to categorize suspected terrorists 
within a reasonably narrow range, the government would have in its 
arsenal a very powerful weapon for fighting terrorism.  The ability to 
pinpoint terrorists with a reasonable degree of accuracy would allow 
the government to focus its efforts and resources in a manner that 
would significantly increase the likelihood of preventing and deter-
ring terrorism.  There does not seem to be another comparable al-
ternative so easily available to the government.  Given the potential 
effectiveness of racial profiling and the ease with which racial profil-
ing can be implemented, it is reasonable to consider at least the pos-
sibility that a wisely designed policy of racial profiling is a narrowly 
tailored means to further the end of deterring terrorism. 
A final proposal of modification to the current search policy is 
expanding the search to cover the persons of passengers.  This makes 
sense because terrorists do not only carry explosives in bags and con-
tainers, but also attach bombs to their bodies.  Consider the fre-
quency of suicide bombings in the Middle East where the attackers 
strap explosives to themselves, hiding them from public view with a 
coat or baggy clothing.  While this modification would probably en-
hance deterrence, it may very well be unconstitutional.  Searching the 
actual person takes the intrusion into privacy up a notch from look-
ing at the contents of a bag.275  Passengers have higher subjective ex-
 
 272 Id. (“[S]uch classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored 
measures that further compelling governmental interests.”). 
 273 See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (explaining the 
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 274 See Taylor, supra note 256, at 3406 
     We have no good alternative [to racial profiling].  For the foresee-
able future, the shortage of high-tech bomb-detection machines and 
the long delays required to search luggage by hand will make it impos-
sible to effectively screen more than a small percentage of . . . bags.  
The only real protection is to make national origin a key factor in 
choosing those bags. 
 275 See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004).  In Flores-
Montano, the Court explained that “highly intrusive searches of the person,” which 
implicate the “dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched,” require a 
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pectations of privacy when it comes to searches of their persons.276  
Moreover, based on society’s reliance on subways as a quicker and 
less-expensive commuting alternative to driving, an objective expecta-
tion of privacy exists as well.277  While the justification for the intru-
sion—preventing and deterring terrorism—is entitled to serious 
weight, the manner of conducting it—physically touching the person 
and looking beyond what is observable on the surface—seems prob-
lematic.278  Furthermore, such searches would be more time consum-
ing, resulting in greater inconvenience to subway passengers. 
B. Changes to Supplement the Search Policy 
Supplementing the random search policy with additional anti-
terrorism measures would probably be the most effective way to com-
bat terrorism.  Such measures include the use of explosives-detection 
technology, the use of bomb-sniffing dogs, the use of video surveil-
lance, and better intelligence gathering and analysis.  Of course, all 
of these additional measures must survive constitutional scrutiny. 
Explosives-detection technology, such as detection of trace 
amounts of chemicals commonly used in bombs,279 are actually less 
invasive than hands-on bag checks and thus seem likely to be held 
constitutional.  Since this technology eliminates the need for patting 
down the passenger,280 it is “no more extensive or intensive than nec-
essary, in light of current technology, to detect weapons or explo-
 
border searches include the authority to disassemble and assemble a vehicle’s fuel 
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random bag searches also constitute “routine” searches, given the similarities be-
tween the two types of searches (e.g., interest in public safety, generalized as opposed 
to specific).  See supra Parts III.B.2., III.C. (discussing governmental interests that jus-
tify suspicionless searches and undertaking constitutional analysis of NYPD’s search 
policy, respectively). 
 276 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968) (characterizing a pat-down search as “a 
serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity 
and arouse strong resentment”). 
 277 See supra text accompanying note 77. 
 278 See supra text accompanying note 86. 
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 Patrick McGeehan, Explosives Detector at Newark Airport Is Expected to Reduce Pat-
Down Searches, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2005, at B4.  The Transportation Security Admini-
stration has already installed a new type of explosives-detection machine known as 
trace portals at Newark Liberty International Airport.  Id.  The machine works by 
blowing a series of puffs of air at each person who steps inside it.  Id.  The air forces 
particles from the person onto the ground, where they are sucked into vents for 
chemical analysis.  Id.  If chemicals used in explosives are detected, the machine sig-
nals an alarm.  Id. 
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sives.”281  If the technology is limited to the purpose of explosives de-
tection and passengers are given the option of avoiding the technol-
ogy by choosing not to ride the subway, then such technology appears 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.282 
The use of bomb-sniffing dogs has been considered by the Su-
preme Court of the United States and has been held to be constitu-
tional due to the very limited nature of its invasion into personal pri-
vacy.283  In fact, because canine sniffs do not require any opening of 
bags, do not expose any personal items that would otherwise have 
remained hidden from public observation, and are necessarily lim-
ited to disclosing the presence or absence of contraband, the Su-
preme Court has held that they do not even constitute searches un-
der the Fourth Amendment.284 
Video surveillance, which would not differ substantially from the 
type used for security in office buildings, should be constitutional.  
Since the subway system is a public place, there is arguably no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.285  Indeed, “surveillance cameras have 
become commonplace in airports, highway tollbooths, parking ga-
rages, stores, malls, banks, ATMs, the Statue of Liberty and at the 
Golden Gate Bridge,”286 and are generally accepted by the public. 
VI.     CONCLUSION 
The implementation of the NYPD’s random search policy raises 
the type of issue that will be at the forefront of legal debates and 
courtroom litigation in the years to come.  While the tools of legal 
analysis will allow lawyers and judges to decide whether measures 
such as the NYPD’s random search policy are constitutional, that de-
termination is only the first step in fighting terrorism.  To truly be 
most effective in this new war of the modern age, members of the le-
gal community, legislators, and politicians, along with ordinary citi-
zens, will have to work together to battle an enemy that seeks to de-
stroy the American way of life.  The proposed changes discussed in 
this Comment provide a starting point for collaborative effort.  Be-
cause the enemy is elusive and able to adapt to anti-terror measures, 
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 United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2005); see supra text ac-
companying note 171. 
 282 See Marquez, 410 F.3d at 616; see supra text accompanying note 171. 
 283 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 697–98 (1983). 
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 285 See Peter T. Kilborn, For Security, Tourists to Be on Other Side of Cameras, N.Y. 
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the American people must not be narrow-minded in combating ter-
rorism.  A combination of measures—for example, random subway 
searches, new explosives-detection technology, and increased video 
surveillance—working in conjunction, will act as a better deterrence 
and prevention system than any measure used alone.  Additionally, 
and somewhat paradoxically, considering the need for open-
mindedness, highly controversial measures such as racial profiling 
may prove to be helpful in identifying and apprehending terrorists.  
Of course, all of these measures must be balanced against the risk of 
infringement upon individual liberties and rights, for if too much 
freedom is sacrificed for the sake of national security, the terrorists 
will have won anyway.  Since this balance is so delicate, both pro-
security advocates and pro-civil liberties advocates need to remember 
that each needs the other more than either may be willing to admit. 
 
